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Abstract 
 
Tax evasion is the basic characteristic of many developing countries. De facto tax 
collections are consequently far below revenue implied by published or de jure tax 
rates. This paper empirically examines tax rates (tariff plus VAT rates) as the 
determinants of customs revenue evasion across products, based on a systematic 
analysis of discrepancies in trade declarations for trading partners, United Republic 
of Tanzania, Republic of South Africa and China. The results indicate that trade 
gap is highly correlated with tax rates, that is, much more value is lost for products 
with higher tax rates. The results also show that the trade gap is correlated with tax 
rates on closely related products from Republic of South Africa, implying that 
evasion takes place through misclassification of imports from higher-taxed 
categories to lower-taxed ones. However, there is no evidence of misclassification 
of imports from China. The wide divergences between the effective and statutory 
tax rates in Tanzanian tax system indicate that there is a scope for raising tax 
revenue without increasing tax rates by reinforcing tax and customs administrations 
and reducing tax evasion. 
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1. Introduction 
Underground economies are considered to characterize most less developing 
countries (LDCs)(Johnson et al., 1997, 1998). According to Schneider and 
Enste (2000) during the 1994-1995 period, the underground economy in LDCs 
was 39 percent of GDP, compared to 35 percent of GDP in countries of the 
former Soviet Union, and 20.9 percent in Eastern Europe. On average, the size 
of the informal economy in Africa in 2010 was estimated at 40.3 percent of 
GDP (Schneider et. al, 2010). In Tanzania, the underground economy is 
estimated at 56.4 percent, a figure that is closely similar to 58.3 percent in 
Zimbabwe, and 55.2 percent in Nigeria (Figure 1.1).  
 
The underground economy in Tanzania and most other LDCs is, among others, 
characterized by unreported and/or underreported legal activities (Johnson et 
al., 1997, 1998). The general accepted reason for existence and flourish of 
underreporting is to avoid high tax rates. The prohibitive high tax rates are 
argued to force firms to hide their activities in the “shadow”. Other causes of 
unreported and/or underreported activities include predatory behaviour of 
government officials, escaping extortion by criminal gangs, and inadequacy of 
institutional environment or weak contract enforcement (Johnson et al., 
1999).  
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between official tax 
rates and tariff evasion in Tanzania. The paper quantifies the effects of official 
tax rates on tariff evasion by examining the relationship in Tanzania between 
the tariff schedule and the evasion gap defined as the difference between 
exporting countries’ reported exports to Tanzania at the product level and 
Tanzania’s reported imports from exporting countries.† The paper provides a
                                                 
†
 The paper considered South Africa, China, and UAE as  major trading partners to Tanzania 
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Figure 1.1: Shadow Economy in Africa (Percent of GDP), 2010 
(Ranked by Total Tax Evaded) 
 
 
 
Notes: Data on the size of shadow economies came from a World Bank working paper; by Friedrich Schneider, Andreas Buehn and Claudio E. 
Montenegro. Published in July, 2010 
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framework for policy makers to know the significant relationship between 
tax rates and evasion in evaluation of alternative tax policies because tax 
rates are instruments that can be manipulated for policy goals and because 
that rate changes may have a substantial impact on evasion. 
 
2. Tax Rates, Undervaluation of Imports  and Tax Effort 
It is widely recognized that one of the objectives of tax reforms is to 
improve the efficiency of the tax administration and hence reduce tax 
evasion. Although the empirical evidence is mixed it seems that tax reform 
measures in some developing countries have not helped to reduce tax 
evasion (Fjeldstad and Rakner, 2003). One important area where tax 
evasion has been reported to be a severe problem in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) is customs duties (Levin and Widell, 2007). For example, study by 
Arndt and Tarp, 2003 on efficiency and equity gains from trade policy 
reforms in Mozambique shows that actual tariff revenue in 1997 was 
slightly less than 40 percent of the level projected by the de jure tariff rate 
and estimated import volume. A study by Mpango (1996) shows that the 
magnitude of deliberate aggregate under-invoicing of imports in Tanzania 
is about 20 percent induced by high scheduled tariff rates, vigorous 
exchange rate adjustment, low salaries and minimum incentives offered to 
the customs staff.   
 
Moreover, the confederation of Tanzania industries (CTI) shows that the 
value of lost revenues from customs and sales tax due to misclassification 
and undervaluation of imported goods amounted to more than Tshs. 250 
billion for the period between March 1993 and March 1994 (Osoro et al., 
1999). Official statistics on reported revenue from customs duties also 
indicate substantial leakages. While the most prevalent official customs 
duties in the period 1993–2011 were between 6.6 and 18 percent, the 
reported duties as a percentage of official import value were between 4.5 
and 11.6 per cent (Table 2.1). In the years 1993, 2006, and 2010 this figure 
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fell below 5 per cent. A significant positive relationship between tax 
evasion and tariff rates is reported by many studies, and the argument has 
been that as tariff rates increase, the proportion of official rates that is 
actually collected falls.3  
 
Table 2.1: Statutory Tariff Rates and Collected Tariff Rates, 1993-2011 
 
 
Statutory Tariff 
Rate 
 
 
 
Collected Tariff 
Rate 
 
 
Difference between 
Statutory and 
Collected Tariff rates 
 
 
1993 15.6 
 
4.5 
 
11.1 
 
1997 18.3 
 
9.7  8.6  
1998 18.3 
 
11.6  6.7  
2000 13.1 
 
8.3  4.8  
2001 12.4 
 
8.8  3.6  
2002 9.2 
 
6.6  2.6  
2003 8.2 
 
7.4  0.8  
2005 8.4 
 
6.6  1.8  
2006 7.2 
 
4.0  3.2  
2007 7.2 
 
5.2  2.0  
2008 10.9 
 
5.1  5.8  
2009 10.8 
 
5.1  5.7  
2010 8.2 
 
4.5  3.7  
2011 6.6 
 
5.0  1.6  
   
    
Sources: Based on data from the Tanzania Revenue Authority and Bank of Tanzania 
 
The Government of Tanzania expected that reduced statutory rates would 
contribute to reduced tax evasion and therefore raise tax revenue; 
however, the wide divergences between the collected tariff rates and 
statutory tax rates in the Tanzanian tax system indicate that tax evasion is 
still an endemic problem, which appears to be substantial and widespread. 
A major problem in this respect is undervaluation of imported goods, 
                                                 
3
 Ebrill, L., J. Stotsky, and R. Gropp (1999) and Pritchett, L., and G. Sethi (1994) define collected tariff 
rate as the ratio of import duties to the value of imports. The measure is based on how much tariff revenue 
is actually collected. 
6 
 
which applies to most own-funds imports. This is due to the fact that the 
importer has access to foreign exchange without going through Bank of 
Tanzania records. Moreover, administrative constraints and corruption at 
entry points increase the problem of undervaluation of imported goods 
(Basu and Morrissey, 1993). 
 
As Tanzania and other low-income countries rely on trade taxes as an 
important source of revenue, evasion of import duties has attracted a lot of 
attention from policy makers. Estimates of this missing revenue are almost 
invariably large enough to be of macroeconomic interest. An IMF's staff 
review of various countries’ experiences finds that nearly half of the low-
income countries that cut their tariff rates due to trade liberalization, and 
suffered an associated revenue loss, recovered less than 70 percent of the 
lost revenue from other sources (IMF survey, 2005). This finding is 
consistent with the stylized fact that tax evasion and a large informal sector 
limit the amount of revenue government can rise from other sources 
(Acharya, 1985; de Soto, 1989; and Bearser et al., 2000).  
 
Tanzania’s tax effortcompares unfavourably to many other sub-Saharan 
African countries. Figure 2.1 shows that some countries collect as little as 
half of what they would be expected to, while others collect up to 2 to 3 
times what they would be expected to. Twenty-four countries have a tax 
effort index (including resource-related tax revenues) higher than 1. 
Eighteen countries (out of 42 African countries) including Tanzania have 
indices lower than 1. A low tax effort ratio, below one, indicates that 
Tanzania is collecting less tax than predicted. 
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Figure 2.1: Tax Effort across African Countries in 2007 
 
Notes: (*) 2006 data , (**) The tax effort measures of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland reflect their membership in the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), which collects customs duties centrally and redistributes them amongst members.  
Source: AEO country surveys, 2010. 
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The slow growth in the overall revenue in Tanzania has raised serious 
concerns over the years. The tax system fails to capture potential revenues 
from economic activities due to the size and fast growth of the informal 
sector. The economy of Tanzania is mainly characterized by low per capita 
income and based on subsistence agriculture, which is difficult to tax. The 
formal sector, which is generally easier to tax, is limited to some large scale 
farms producing agricultural products for export, minerals, and some large 
manufacturing enterprises such as for beer, non-alcoholic drinks, tobacco, 
and other commodities. However, to the extent that the formal sector buys 
from informal sector, this may also impair tax administration (Ebrill et al., 
1997). The presence of large inefficient state-owned enterprises also limits 
revenue collection. At the same time sluggish private sector growth has not 
generated enough revenue to compensate for revenue loss from the 
shrinking parastatal sector (World Bank, 1996). In addition to poor tax 
structure, Tanzania’s tax system is characterized by weak tax and customs 
administration such as weak management practices and weak law 
enforcement, which impair efforts to raise revenue (Osoro, 1995; Fjeldstad, 
2002). 
 
The value of revenue loss from customs and other sources due to 
smuggling and undervaluation of imported goods is widespread in 
Tanzania where tax structure is exceedingly complex and tax 
administrative is weak. For example, customs revenue loss in 1993-1994 
amounted to 2.5 times higher than reported customs revenue (Fjeldstad, 
2002). According to ESRF (1996), official import statistics underreport the 
value of imports by as much as 70 percent. Gray et al. (2001), estimate that 
the magnitude of evasion of import taxes alone averages 2.1 percent of 
GDP.  
 
The potential gain from involvement in tax evasion could be considerable 
both for officials and taxpayers. Relatively high rates and a complex and 
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partly incoherent set of rules result in large potential rewards for taxpayers 
willing to bribe to cut their own tax burden and/or speed up customs 
clearance of their goods.  For customs officials, the bribes taken for clearing 
specific containers in Dar es Salaam harbour could be as much as a whole 
year’s salary (Fjeldstad, 2002). Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) argue 
that, generally, high tax rates combined with deteriorating economic 
situation have tended to shift production towards those activities that are 
difficult to the tax net. In this connection, one can argue that the emergence 
of the underground economy has partly been a consequence of tax evasion 
(Osoro, 1995).  
 
Despite quite comprehensive changes in tax structure (rates and bases) 
after 1998, the tax system in Tanzania is still complicated and relatively 
non-transparent (Osoro et al., 1999). Tax legislation is unclear and causes 
random and partly ad hoc collection procedures (Luoga, 2002). This 
situation is costly for enterprises and provides strong incentives to pay 
customs officers for a speedier service. Generally, inefficient customs 
operations such as long clearance times and complicated procedures act as 
dissipative trade barriers, which raise the costs of imports without 
generating revenues. Corruption and inefficiency are often two faces of the 
same coin as customs officers deliberately obstruct procedures in order to 
force traders to pay bribes. These are very serious issues, which help 
explain why countries having reformed their trade regimes but not their 
customs administration have sometimes failed to reap the full benefit of 
trade liberalization (Anson et al., 2003). 
 
The double declaration of trade flows by importers and exporters offers an 
opportunity to gauge the importance of these unlawful practices; while 
evading customs duties generally requires the importers to sidestep import 
registration requirement, the situation is different for exporters. Bhagwati 
(1964) pioneered the use of discrepancies between “matched” declarations 
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often at product level to reveal customs duties evasion. The result pointed 
to under-invoicing of import in Turkey. Following Fisman and Wei (2004), 
and Javocik and Narciso (2008), the differences between the country’s 
reported value of imports from a partner country and the corresponding 
value of exports of the same product reported by the trading partner is 
termed as the trade gap (see equation 1). 
                             ( ) ( )cpitpcitcpit IVEVGV loglog −=                                                        (1) 
where cpitGV  is a trade gap (evasion gap) in the importing country c, cpitIV  
is the value of imports for country c of product i from a particular country p 
at time t, and pcitEV is the value of exports reported by a partner country p 
to country c of the same product. 
  
The estimates of the evasion gap in Tanzania is presented in Table 2.2, 
using Tanzania’s trade relations with her major trading partners, indicate 
positive values of the evasion gap for imports with higher tariff rates such 
as vegetables, food products, textile and clothing, stone and glass,  
footwear, and hides and skins. This can be attributed to under-invoicing 
and outright smuggling, which make importers evade customs duties. The 
high incidence of evasion, which is recorded in many of the commodities 
imported, suggests that customs administration is characterized by 
inefficiencies. It is estimated that in 2012 as much as 182.9 percent of 
textile and clothing, 277.4 percent of footwear, and 113.8 percent of hides 
and skins were not reported to the destination office (Table 2.3). 
 
As the official trade statistics are delivered from the import and export 
declaration made by the dealers, there are at least five reasons why import 
value from importing country may differ from the corresponding exporting 
country. The first reason for major discrepancies in trade statistics is the 
undercount of export data which follows from exporters’ failure to  
 
11 
 
Table 2.2: Tanzania’s Major Trading Partners: Estimated Evasion Gap, 2012 
Product Group 
 
World 
 
China 
 
 
United Arab 
Emirates 
 
 
South Africa 
 
 
 
EV 
 
IV 
 
GV 
 
MFN 
Tariff 
 
EV 
 
IV 
 
GV 
 
MFN 
Tariff 
 
EV 
 
IV 
 
GV 
 
MFN 
Tariff 
 
EV 
 
IV 
 
GV 
 
 
MFN 
Tariff 
 
 
Consumer Goods 6.6 6.8 -0.2 16.6 5.9 5.6 0.4 20.8 5.3 5.2 0.1 20.6 5.3 5.6 -0.3 17.3 
Capital Goods 6.4 6.5 -0.1 5.8 5.8 5.7 0.1 7.5 4.9 5.1 -0.2 10.2 5.4 5.5 0.0 3.9 
Intermediate Goods 6.3 6.3 -0.1 12.1 5.7 5.4 0.2 18.6 4.6 5.0 -0.3 15.4 5.3 5.4 -0.1 10.3 
Machinery/Electricity 6.3 6.3 0.0 6.9 5.2 5.5 -0.3 10.1 4.8 5.0 -0.2 12.3 5.4 5.0 0.4 5.6 
Fuels 6.1 6.6 -0.4 0.7 3.3 3.9 -0.6 3.6 4.3 4.3 0.0 20.6 4.4 5.4 -1.0 3.6 
Transportation 6.0 6.1 -0.2 7.3 5.1 5.4 -0.3 6.1 4.7 4.8 -0.1 10.7 4.7 5.0 -0.2 8.1 
Vegetables 5.9 5.9 0.0 21.0 3.1 2.7 0.4 5.3 3.3 3.2 0.1 21.1 3.6 3.4 0.2 22.6 
Chemicals 5.8 5.9 -0.1 4.2 5.0 5.0 -0.0 3.9 4.1 4.7 -0.6 14.0 4.6 4.7 -0.1 11.3 
Metals 5.8 5.9 -0.1 11.0 5.3 5.1 0.3 15.5 4.7 4.5 0.1 15.7 3.6 5.2 -1.6 9.0 
Textile /Clothing 5.8 5.4 0.5 26.6 5.6 4.9 0.7 27.7 4.5 4.2 0.3 25.8 3.6 3.5 0.1 23.7 
Plastic or Rubber 5.7 5.8 -0.1 14.3 5.3 5.1 0.2 15.5 4.5 4.4 0.1 16.9 4.6 4.7 -0.1 6.9 
Raw Materials 5.7 5.6 0.0 14.3 3.5 3.7 -0.2 8.2 3.4 3.4 0.0 16.4 4.2 4.0 0.2 14.6 
Miscellaneous 5.4 5.6 -0.2 12.0 5.0 4.8 0.2 25.0 4.4 4.3 0.2 22.8 4.6 4.4 0.2 9.4 
Food Products 5.8 5.5 0.3 21.5 3.7 3.5 0.2 23.4 4.1 4.0 0.0 23.3 4.6 4.1 0.5 21.1 
Wood 5.3 5.3 0.1 14.8 4.7 4.4 0.3 22.8 4.0 3.7 0.3 19.2 4.6 4.5 0.1 19.6 
Minerals 5.3 5.1 0.2 25.9 4.6 4.7 -0.0 2.3 2.7 3.2 -0.6 9.7 2.8 2.7 0.1 4.7 
Footwear 5.2 4.6 0.6 24.3 5.1 4.3 0.8 24.4 3.8 3.6 0.2 24.6 3.3 3.1 0.2 23.3 
Stone and Glass 5.1 5.1 0.0 22.1 4.9 4.9 0.1 22.9 4.2 3.9 0.3 23.3 3.9 3.6 0.3 21.8 
Animals 4.6 4.4 0.1 44.3 3.2 2.6 0.6 25.0 3.3 3.0 0.2 32.7 3.5 3.4 0.1 54.4 
Hides and Skins 4.4 4.0 0.3 25.0 4.5 3.9 0.6 25.0 3.5 3.3 0.2 24.7 2.8 2.5 0.2 24.7 
Source: Author’s estimations: Computed with data from World Bank’s Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) data base
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Table 2.3: Percent Share of Missing Imports from Major Trading Partners 
Attributed to Under-Invoicing, 2012 
 
Product Group 
 
World 
 
China 
 
UAE 
 
South Africa 
 
 
 
Group4 
 
Total5 
 
Group 
 
Total 
 
Group 
 
Total 
 
Group 
 
Total 
 
 
Consumer Goods -35.4 -17.7 121.6 38.0 33.4 4.9 -51.9 -21.7 
Capital Goods -16.6 -4.2 37.5 15.7 -41.3 -5.6 -5.0 -1.6 
Intermediate Goods -15.7 -3.0 66.5 16.0 -52.6 -4.9 -19.7 -5.3 
Machinery and Electricity -4.9 -0.8 -46.6 -11.6 -42.1 -4.7 169.0 16.8 
Fuels -64.3 -21.0 -72.4 -0.4 5.3 0.1 -91.0 -25.1 
Transportation -31.6 -3.7 -43.8 -9.0 -18.4 -1.3 -41.1 -4.1 
Vegetables 4.4 0.3 150.0 0.1 -16.7 0.0 64.6 0.2 
Chemicals -15.9 -1.1 -1.6 -0.2 -75.1 -4.0 -11.4 -0.6 
Metals -18.5 -1.3 77.4 8.3 39.9 1.4 -97.6 -18.3 
Textile and Clothing 182.9 3.5 408.9 25.3 83.5 1.5 35.5 0.1 
Plastic or Rubber -26.0 -1.5 65.9 7.0 38.7 0.9 -11.5 -0.6 
Raw Materials 9.4 0.4 -35.6 -0.2 10.1 0.0 56.9 0.7 
Miscellaneous -39.4 -1.5 50.2 2.8 45.2 0.9 54.1 1.5 
Food Products -14.5 -0.4 74.1 0.2 10.9 0.1 202.2 2.6 
Wood 21.8 0.3 93.4 1.9 100.8 0.5 27.3 1.0 
Minerals 61.7 0.6 -1.6 -0.1 -72.7 -0.1 22.8 0.0 
Footwear 277.4 0.9 484.0 9.1 52.3 0.2 53.0 0.1 
Stone and Glass -3.7 0.0 13.6 0.8 96.1 0.8 98.3 0.4 
Animal 29.6 0.1 252.0 0.1 74.3 0.1 23.3 0.1 
Hides and Skins 
 
113.8 
 
0.1 
 
318.3 
 
2.1 
 
70.9 
 
0.1 
 
69.4 
 
0.0 
 
Source: Author’s estimations: Computed with data from World Bank’s Integrated Trade 
Solutions (WITS) data base. 
 
properly file export declarations. Some shippers do not file declarations 
due to lack of understanding of filling requirements while others simply do 
not bother to file. Studies show that enforcement for complying with 
import regulations is stricter than with exports regulations. The second 
major reason for a non-zero trade gap is related to transit trade with third 
countries. For example South Africa exporters passing their goods to 
                                                 
4
 Percent of respective product group 
5
 Percent of total imports 
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Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) through Tanzania may fail to declare 
the outbound movement from Tanzania, i.e. they may treat exports to DRC 
through Tanzania in the same way as they treat exports to Tanzania; such 
transactions may be captured as exports to Tanzania in South Africa 
statistics, while in Tanzania it will be classified as re-exports and will not be 
reflected in trade data with South Africa, thus leading to a positive 
Tanzania trade gap. The third source of discrepancies in trade statistics are 
the methodological differences between statistical agencies of importing 
country and exporting country. Each agency edits trade data according to 
its own procedure. As a result, differences in trade definition, currency 
conversions, valuation etc, can lead to an imbalance in trade statistics 
between the two countries. 
 
The fourth reason for a trade gap to be different from zero is due to various 
actions undertaken by traders in order to avoid paying import duties. 
Fisman and Wei (2004) find that the Chinese trade gap with Hong Kong has 
a strong negative relationship with Chinese tariffs against imports from 
Hong Kong. Javorcik and Narciso (2008) find similar results for the German 
trade with Eastern European countries. In both studies, it is implicitly 
assumed that if the trade is driven by a measurement error only, it should 
be unrelated to any measure of trade policy. Thus, a statistical relationship 
between a trade gap and tariffs is interpreted as evidence of tariff evasion 
in countries with high trade barriers. Figure 2.2 (panel A-D) reports the 
correlation between trade gap and most favored nation (MFN) weighted 
average tariff rates for Tanzania’s imports with its major trading partners. 
All panels reveal a positive association-ship between tariff evasion and 
tariff rates.  
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Figure 2.2: Scatter Diagram 
Panel A: Imports from All Trading Partners 
 
Source: Author’s estimations: Computed with data from World Bank’s Integrated 
Trade Solutions (WITS) data base and UNCTAD TRAINS 
 
Panel B: Imports from China 
 
Source: Author’s estimations: Computed with data from World Bank’s Integrated 
Trade Solutions (WITS) data base and UNCTAD TRAINS 
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Panel C: Imports from United Arab Emirates 
 
Source: Author’s estimations: Computed with data from World Bank’s Integrated 
Trade Solutions (WITS) data base and UNCTAD TRAINS 
 
Panel D: Imports from South Africa 
 
Source: Author’s estimations: Computed with data from World Bank’s Integrated 
Trade Solutions (WITS) data base and UNCTAD TRAINS 
 
It is postulated in theory that changes in the official import tariff rate have 
both direct and indirect impact on customs revenue. Importers avoid 
paying import duties for commodities with high tariff rates. However, the 
interpretation of the estimated data on tariff evasion needs caution because 
of the possible inclusion of misclassified indirect imports in reported data 
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(Fisman and Wei, 2004, and Brafu-Insaidoo and Obeng, 2008). Part of 
indirect imports may be misclassified as direct imports. More, the data as 
presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, and Figure 2.2 are on group commodity 
values and MFN weighted tariff rates, which may conceal accurate 
information on estimates for individual commodities and tariff rates. To 
avoid this problem regression analysis presented in section five uses 
individual countries’ trade records that is recorded according to the 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) at 6-digit 
category. 
 
3. Literature Review 
Tax evasion has been universal and persistent problem in every country in 
the world and should be considered a potential problem everywhere. 
However, tax evasion is a phenomenon that hits developing countries 
(Fjeldstad, 2002). McLaren (1996) characterizes the extent of tax evasion 
in general in LDCs as “staggering” and suggests that the value of taxes 
avoided is often close to the value of actual collections for major taxes.  
 
Evidence from different developing countries indicates that the treasury 
due to corruption and tax evasion cannot trace half or more of the taxes 
that should be collected. This erosion of tax base has several detrimental 
fiscal effects. The consequences of lost revenue to the funding of public 
services are of special concern (Tanzi, 2003). In addition, it creates 
deadweight (allocative efficiency) loss on the economy (Harberger, 1964), 
and also undermines equity in taxation by shifting the burden in the 
direction of honest, socially responsible individual and corporations. 
Furthermore, a growing shadow economy gives rise to increasing segments 
of the money supply, which is uncontrolled, and thus undermines inflation 
policy. Any increase in the rate of inflation can also result in a significant 
long-term deadweight loss (Feldstein, 1996). So, it is important to have a 
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proper understanding of the incentive structure that derives the behavior 
that shapes the temporal development of the shadow economy. 
 
The incentive to avoid and evade taxes in response to an increasing tax 
burden has been long-recognized, the level of tax rate is linked to the 
security of the tax base, the higher are the taxes, the greater is the risk to 
the base. According to Gutmann (1977), higher taxes derive more and more 
of the economy underground, beyond the reach of the tax collector. The 
sign of relationship between the tax rate level and the amount of income 
declared by taxpayer, however, is the question still not satisfactorily 
resolved. In the pioneering model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the 
relationship between tax rates and evasion is ambiguous, and depends on 
the third derivative of the utility function. They show that for a risk-neutral 
individual maximization of expected utility implies that evasion will tend to 
increase with marginal tax rate. When risk aversion is allowed, however, 
they conclude that no clear-cut hypothesis emerges as to the connection 
between the regular tax rate and reported income. Furthermore, Yitzhaki 
(1974) summaries this analysis by showing that the tax rate in Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972)'s model has a substitution effect favoring evasion and 
an income effect discouraging it and that the net effect is uncertain. Though 
the theoretical ambiguity remains for the relationship between tax rates 
and evasion, Bhagwati (1964) explicitly links up the discrepancies between 
import data of Turkey and the export data of her partner countries and 
suggests that the discrepancies between a country’s reported imports and 
the corresponding exports reported by its trading partners may be 
explained by the undervaluation or misclassification of imports at the 
border in order to reduce the tariff burden. 
 
Pritchett and Sethi (1994) examine the correlation between the tariff rates 
using data from Jamaica, Kenya, and Pakistan and find a weak relationship 
between the de facto tariff rates, calculated by dividing tariff revenue with 
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import values for each product, and the statutory rates. This nonlinear 
relationship between collected rates and statutory tariff rates indicates that 
incentives for misreporting increase with higher tariff rate. Fisman and Wei 
(2004) examine bilateral trade data between Hong Kong and China in an 
attempt to identify the effect of tax rates on tax evasion, and they note that 
the evasion gap is highly correlated with tax rates. According to their 
findings, tariff rate declines, particularly for highly taxed items, would 
result in substantial increases in revenue. They conclude that practice such 
as under-reporting import unit values and mislabeling higher-taxed 
products, as lower-taxed categories are widespread.  
 
Van Dunem and Arndt (2009) using the same approach for the case of 
Mozambique find an elasticity half as large as in Chinese case. Applying the 
same approach to trade between Germany and ten Eastern European 
countries in 1992-2007, Javorcik and Narciso (2008) find support for the 
hypothesis that higher product-level tariffs spur higher levels of tariff 
evasion with estimated elasticities that tend to be weaker than those found 
by Fisman and Wei (2004). Javorcik and Narciso (2008)  also show that the 
relationship between reporting discrepancies and tariffs is stronger for 
differentiated products, which they explain by the greater ease to conceal 
the real value of goods when they are differentiated, as also suggested by 
Bhagwati (1967). 
 
These empirical studies suggest that customs duty evasion due to high 
tariffs is not specific to a few countries, however, given the nature of 
imports and export data, the assumption of trade gap (tariff evasion) 
implies that countries with high tariffs, traders would tend to under-report 
the value of imports at the destination country and report the true value of 
exports at the source country. Are there any reasons to believe that 
smugglers truthfully report their export declaration? Until it is known how 
a trade gap and import tariffs are related to a firm’s incentive to report its 
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imports and exports, we cannot be sure that the relationship between trade 
gap and tariffs, found in previous studies pertains to tariff evasion. As it 
turn out firms incentives to report imports and exports truthfully vary 
across countries, depending on the systems of trade control, penalties for 
misreporting, and trade law enforcement. 
 
Understanding of the relationship between tax rates and customs revenue 
evasion is important for policy formulation and implementation of further 
trade reforms, however, evasion of customs revenues has captured little 
attention compared with other forms of taxes. The lack of attention is due 
to the fact that most of the research on revenue has been carried out in the 
developed world where customs revenues occupy a marginal role in the 
revenue structure of the economy. In developing countries however, 
international trade offers the only reliable base for levying taxes since the 
formal sector is not large enough to warrant adequate amount of direct 
taxes. Hence the trade-sector becomes the niche sector of the economy for 
mobilization of resources. Thus, the study on tariff evasion in Tanzania is of 
great importance. In addition, since several studies show that there is an 
ambiguity about the direction of the impact of the level of tax rate on tax 
evasion as well as the problems of measurement of evasion, this paper 
explores the correlation between tax rates (tariff and import VAT rates) 
and tariff revenue evasion for Tanzania, using the reporting gap between 
exporting and importing country agencies. 
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4. Methodology of the Study 
4.1. Estimation Model 
The analysis in this paper is based on the methodology used by Fisman and 
Wei (2004). The methodology is preferred because  of the fact that other 
indirect approaches such as currency demand, and discrepancies between 
national expenditure and income statistics (Guttmann, 1977, Feige, 1979, 
and Tanzi, 1980) do not naturally generate an estimate of the 
responsiveness of tax evasion (trade gap) to changes in tax rate (Fisman 
and Wei, 2004). They also may not be suitable for studying tax evasion in 
the non-monetized economy such as Tanzania. Since, China’s and South 
Africa’s exports to Tanzania accounts for the main imports of Tanzania, the 
paper examines evasion in Tanzania’s imports from China and South Africa, 
at a disaggregated level, by comparing China and South Africa reported 
exports and Tanzania reported imports of the same products. In the 
absence of evasion (and measurement error), Tanzania and China and 
South Africa-reported numbers should be the same.  
 
The trade gap is measured as the differences between the value of exports 
from China and South Africa in each product in a sample as reported by 
China and South Africa (the exporting countries), and the value of imports 
from China and South Africa as reported by Tanzania (the importing 
country).6 In other words, for every product that Tanzania imports from 
China and South Africa, the export value (EV) is defined as the value 
reported by China and South Africa and the import value (IV) as that value 
reported by Tanzania. Furthermore, export quantity (EQ) is defined as the 
total quantity of exports reported by China and South Africa and import 
quantity (IQ) as the total quantity of imports reported by Tanzania. The 
basic definition of the evasion gap is therefore expressed as  
                                                 
6
 The ideal way to measure the gap is to use import values and exports values exclusive of CIF/FOB. 
However, by regressing gap_qty on tax rate this problem is circumvented and this results in similar λ -
values. In the cases where values are used instead of quantities, the CIF-FOB problem creates a gap value, 
but there is no reason why it should be correlated with the tax rate.  
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Thus, defined, a larger gap is an indication of greater evasion. Similarly, the 
gap in quantities reported is expressed as 
 
             )log()log(
,,,,, TktSorCktkt IQEQGQ −=                                                        (3) 
                                         where GQ = Evasion Gap in Quantities 
The basic issue that is examined in the empirical test is whether the 
difference between exports and imports is increasing in the tax rates, due 
to evasion. That is 
 
                  ktktkt TaxrateGV ,,10, ελλ ++=                                                             (4) 
where 0λ is a constant, and kε  a composite error term that is assumed to 
be independent and identically distributed (iid) and normal with a mean of 
zero and a constant variance. A sub index k denotes product and Taxrate  
denotes product specific tax rates (tariffs plus value added tax rates, where 
tariffs include import duties and excise duties) in Tanzania. The 
expectation is 01 >λ if evasion is induced by tax rate. If, for example, 
2.01 =λ , it will imply that the gap between reported exports and imports 
increases by 2.0  percent if the tax rate increases by one percentage point. 
However, if the idea that higher tariffs encourage fraud sounds plausible a 
priori, the relationship may not, as a matter of fact, be so clear-cut (Anson 
et al., 2003). Anson et al., 2003 state that categories of goods with high 
tariffs may be those most carefully scrutinized by customs so trying to 
evade in those categories may be just the wrong thing to do. Indeed, the 
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relationship between tax rates and tax evasion can theoretically go either 
way (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000).  
 
Due to the fact that part of tax evasion does not only take the form of 
underreporting but also of mislabeling imported products from a higher-
taxed to a lower-taxed type, Fisman and Wei (2004) assume that this type 
of mislabeling is easier for similar products, and therefore, define 
)_( oTaxAvg as the average level of tax rate of all other products in a goods 
4-digit class. Adding the average tax variable to the right hand side of 
equation (4), the following regression function is implemented   
 
    ( ) ktktktktkt otaxAvgTaxrateGV ,,2,,10, _ ελελλ ++++=                              (5) 
 
If evasion by mislabeling of goods is prevalent, one would expect 02 <λ , 
that is, holding a product’s own tax rate constant, the lower the tax rate on 
product k’s similar varieties, the greater the incentive for mislabeling the 
import of product k as other similar products. 
 
So far we have dealt with evasion in values, but evasion in quantities by 
underreporting may also be common. For that case, the following 
regression functions are also investigated   
      
                  ktktkt TaxrateGQ ,,10, ελλ ++=                                                           (6) 
and  
                   ( ) ktktktktkt otaxAvgTaxrateGQ ,,2,,10, _ ελελλ ++++=               (7) 
 
If under-reporting in quantities is established, one would expect 01 >λ in 
the quantity regression (7) and if there is mislabeling of the imports from a 
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higher-taxed type to a lower-taxed one, one would expect 01 >λ  
and 02 <λ . 
 
4.2. Reliability of Data and Some Measurement Errors 
A central challenge when studying the tax evasion concerns the issue of 
measurements. By its very nature, like all forms of fraud, tariff evasion 
cannot be measured directly, so roundabout methods must be applied 
(Anson et al., 2003). The most common one consists of comparing the 
records of exporting country and importing country. Traders attempting to 
evade import tariffs will under-invoice the value of shipments to 
destination customs while no incentive exists at origin ones (Anson et al., 
2003). A discrepancy between the value of exports recorded by the 
exporting country and the value of imports recorded by the importing 
country is to be expected. The first reason is that in practice, statistical 
records used to report exports free-on-board (FOB), while imports value 
include cost-insurance and freight (CIF). This difference may drive a 
systematic difference between reported exports and imports, unrelated to 
tax-induced evasion. The second reason is that countries tend to monitor 
imports more carefully than exports. Thus, in the absence of tariff evasion 
one would expect the discrepancy to be negative. In the presence of import 
tariff evasion, discrepancies between source and destination trade data 
reported to Comtrade by national customs will thus reflect not just 
CIF/FOB differences and measurement error (Feenstra and Hanson, 2000), 
but also the extent of deliberate under-invoicing (Anson et al., 2003).  
 
Stasarage and Daubrée (1998) report that a correct declaration of import’s 
value does not prevent fraud from occurring, since the assessment of tax 
liabilities by customs officers can be purportedly incorrect; when taxes are 
correctly assessed commodities can also be released without the importer 
actually paying these taxes. In most cases, however, a customs duty evasion 
is rendered possible by false import declarations through four types of 
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methods (Fisman and Wei, 2004; Javorcik and Narciso, 2007, Jean and 
Mitaritonna, 2010). Underreporting of unit value, underreporting of 
taxable quantities, misclassification or mislabeling imported products from 
a higher-taxed to a lower-taxed type, and smuggling.7  While different 
practices are involved in each case, each of this means of evading customs 
duties should lead to shipment registered by the importer being lower than 
those registered by the exporter, for high-tariff products (Jean and 
Mitaritonna, 2010). Jean and Mitaritonna, 2010 emphasize that the link 
with tariffs may arise from the higher pay-off of escaping normal taxation 
in that case; it may also reflect the fact that finding a comparable product 
with substantially lower tariff is easier for product facing high tariffs. 
 
4.3. Types of Data and Data Sources  
The trade flow data for studying tax evasion is taken from the World Bank’s 
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data base, which in turn is derived 
from the United Nations’ Comtrade database. These data are collected by 
the United Nations Statistical Division from individual countries’ trade 
records, and include information on imports and exports for each country, 
recorded according to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding 
System (HS) at 6-digit category. The year used in this paper is 2012. The 
data on Tanzanian tariffs are taken from WITS, derived from the UNCTAD 
TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System) database and Tanzania 
Revenue Authority (TRA). The original sample of import from South Africa 
contained 2135 products in 2012 at the 6-digit classifications. However, 
there were missing observations for 488 classifications for either exports 
or imports, leaving a final sample of 1647. Regressions for tariff evasion 
involve fewer observations of imports from China (i.e. 271 commodities) 
due to missing observations on either exports and import values or export 
and import quantities or tariff rates. 
                                                 
7
 Smuggling is generally defined as imports crossing the border without being registered by 
customs officers. Smuggling may not be registered even in the exporter statistics; however, 
exports are duly by the exporters (Jean and Mitaritonna, 2010). 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Descriptive Analysis of Data 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarize some characteristics of the variables used in 
the paper. One point to note is that the evasion gap has a positive mean 
when measured in values and it is more than the evasion gap measured in 
quantities of imports from China but it is less than the evasion gap 
measured in quantities from South Africa, generally, indicating that some 
evasion takes the form of underreporting of per unit values and quantities. 
An important difference between imports from the two major trading 
partners is the size of evasion gap. Trade gap is larger for imports from 
China than for imports from South Africa, when measured in both values 
and quantities. Table 5.1 reports that the mean trade gaps are 0.42 and 
0.77 indices for imports from South Africa when measured in values and 
quantities respectively. These trade gaps are relatively less than 1.37 and 
1.01 indices for imports from China, when measured in values and 
quantities respectively (Table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.1:  Summary Statistics, Full Sample: Import from South Africa 
 
Variable 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
 
Log(EV) 
 
1647 
 
4.616 
 
1.300 
 
0 
 
8.923 
Log(IV) 1647 4.189 1.300 0 7.697 
GV 1647 0.427 1.463 -4.60325 6.129 
Log(EQ) 1455 3.906 1.846 0 7.004 
Log(IQ) 1455 3.182 1.309 0 7.783 
GQ 1455 0.724 1.553 -5.24 6.108 
Tax rate (Tariff plus VAT)  1647 28.857 9.925 10 60 
Avg(tax_o) (at HS4-digit) 42 38.809 6.129 25 55 
 
Note: Summary statistics from balanced data, i.e. those observations containing 
data on both export and import values and quantities. 
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Table 5.2:  Summary Statistics, Full Sample: Import from China 
 
 
Variable 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
 
Log(EV) 
 
271 
 
5.882 
 
2.448 
 
0 
 
11.687 
Log(IV) 271 4.498 1.497 0.602 8.648 
GV 271 1.379 2.616 -5.528 7.082 
Log(EQ) 271 5.450 2.448 0 12.766 
Log(IQ) 271 4.438 1.248 1.812 8.102 
GQ 271 1.011 2.515 -4.751 6.247 
Tax rate (Tariff plus VAT)  271 38.892 21.854 0 80 
Avg(tax_o) (at HS4-digit) 123 41.512 7.460 0 69 
 
Note: Summary statistics from balanced data, i.e. those observations containing 
data on both export and import values and quantities. 
 
The mean tax rate of imports from China is 38.8 percent with maximum 
rate of 80 percent and a mean tax rate for imports from South Africa is 28.8 
percent with the maximum rate of 60 percent. This shows that the average 
tax rate is higher for imports from China than for imports South Africa. This 
may suggest the reason for higher trade gap in trade data for imports from 
China than for imports from South Africa. 
 
5.2. Regression Results 
In this section the empirical results are reported, based on the two 
regression equations discussed in the methodology section. The first issue 
to be analyzed is whether there is any correlation between trade gap 
(evasion gap), both in values and quantities, and tax rates in Tanzania, 
using imports from South Africa and China. The second issue is if the trade 
gaps are due to mislabeling of higher-taxed into lower-taxed products. 
 
The results for the degree of tax evasion in Tanzania in year 2012 using 
imports from South Africa and China are reported in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 
respectively. Both Tables report that the tax rate coefficients are 
significant. Table 5.3 indicates that a one-percentage point increase in the 
27 
 
tax rate leads to a 0.11 percent increase in tax evasion when measured in 
import values from South Africa.  Likewise, Table 5.4 suggests that a one-
percentage point increase in the tax rate leads to approximately 0.11 
percent increase in tax evasion when measured in values of import from 
China. 
Table 5.3: Imports from South Africa 
The Effect of Tax Rate on Evasion (Measured in Value) 
 
 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
Std. Err. 
 
t  
 
tp >  
 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
 
 
Tax Rate 
 
0.115 
 
0.002 
 
50.05*** 
 
0.000 
 
0.110 
 
0.119 
Constant  -2.878 0.069 -41.21*** 0.000 -3.016 -2.741 
 
       
 Obs. =   1647  Prob>F =       0.000 
 F(1, 1645) =2504.7  Adj R-squared =       0.603 
 
      
Note: (i) ***Indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level  
(ii) Dependent Variable: log (Value of Exports from Republic of South 
Africa to United Republic of Tanzania)-log (Value of Imports to Tanzania 
from South Africa).  
 
Table 5.4: Imports from China 
The Effect of Tax Rate on Evasion (Measured in Value) 
 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
Std. Err. 
 
 t  
 
tp >
 
 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
 
 
Tax Rate 
 
0.109 
 
0.002 
 
39.11*** 
 
0.000 
 
0.104 
 
0.115 
Constant  -2.874 0.125 -22.99*** 0.000 -3.120 -2.627 
 
       
 Obs    =  271  Prob>F =       0.000 
 F(1, 269)    =1529.66  Adj R-squared =       0.849 
 
      
Note: (i) ***Indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level  
(ii) Dependent Variable: log (Value of Exports from China to United 
Republic of Tanzania)-log (Value of Imports to Tanzania from China).  
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The adjusted R-squared is larger in the tax evasion regression analysis 
using imports from China than South Africa indicating that variations in the 
trade gaps (measured in values) in Tanzania is more explained by import 
tax rate from China than South Africa. 
 
In addition to underreporting of the value of imports, evasion can also take 
the form of mislabeling a higher taxed product as a lower taxed similar 
variety. If misclassification takes place one would expect the coefficient on 
tax on similar products to be negative, which would signify a lower tariff on 
similar products creates more opportunity for misreporting. Tables 5.5 and 
5.6 report the results with average tax rate on similar products, Avg(Tax_o), 
included as a regressor. Table 5.5 shows that, consistent with the 
mislabeling interpretation, the coefficient on Avg(Tax_o) is negative and 
significant at the 10 percent level, when using import values from South 
Africa. Furthermore, the inclusion of the average tax rate of similar goods 
as a regressor results in a substantial increase in the coefficient on tax rate, 
which takes on value of 0.75. 
 
Table 5.5: Incorporating the Average Tax on Similar Products 
 (Measured in Values): Import from Republic of South Africa 
 
 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
Std. Err 
 
t  
 
tp >  
 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
 
 
Tax Rate 
 
0.750 
 
0.093 
 
8.00*** 
 
0.000 
 
0.560 
 
0.939 
Avg(tax_o) -0.102 0.055 -1.84* 0.073 -0.215 0.009 
Constant  -15.044 2.445 -6.12*** 0.000 -20.012 -10.074 
 
       
 Obs    =          42  Prob>F =       0.0000 
 F(2, 38)  =    35.49  Adj R-squared =       0.6272 
 
 
Note: (i) ***Indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level  
(ii) Dependent Variable: log (Value of Exports from Republic of South 
Africa to United Republic of Tanzania)-log (Value of Imports to Tanzania 
from Republic of South Africa).  
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Table 5.6: Incorporating the Average Tax on Similar Products 
 (Measured in Values): Imports from China 
 
 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
Std. Err 
 
t  
 
tp >  
 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
 
 
Tax Rate 
 
0.107 
 
0.003 
 
30.22*** 
 
0.000 
 
0.100 
 
0.114 
Avg(tax_o) 0.002 0.012 0.23 0.817 -0.021 0.027 
Constant  -2.796 0.553 -5.05*** 0.000 -3.892 -1.699 
 
       
 Obs    =  123  Prob>F =       0.000 
 F(2, 120) =  466.4  Adj R-squared =       0.884 
 
 
Note: (i) ***Indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level  
(ii) Dependent Variable: log (Value of Exports from China to United 
Republic of Tanzania)-log (Value of Imports to Tanzania from China).  
 
When tax on similar products is included as regressor into the tax evasion 
equation using imports from china, the results show that tariff on similar 
products does not appear to be statistically significant. These results 
indicate that mislabeling (at least within the same 4-digit HS category) is 
not widespread in the trade data between China and Tanzania.  However, 
the overall responsiveness of trade gap to the tariff rate retains its 
significance.  
 
When estimating evasion on imports using physical quantities, Tables 5.7 
and 5.8 show that one-percentage point increase in the tax rate leads to a 
0.11 percent and 0.10 percent increase in tax evasion when using physical 
quantities of imports from the Republic of South Africa and China 
respectively.
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Table 5.7: Imports from Republic of South Africa 
The Effect of Tax Rate on Evasion (Measured in Physical Quantity) 
 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
Std. Err 
 
t  
 
tp >  
 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
 
 
Tax Rate 
 
0.112 
 
0.002 
 
40.68*** 
 
0.000 
 
0.107 
 
0.118 
Constant  -2.606 0.086 -30.14*** 0.000 -2.776 -2.4372 
 
       
 Obs   =    1455  Prob>F =       0.000 
 F(1, 1645)   =1654.8  Adj R-squared =       0.532 
 
      
Note: (i) ***Indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level  
(ii) Dependent Variable: log (Quantity of Exports from Republic of South 
Africa to United Republic of Tanzania)-log (Quantity of Imports to Tanzania 
from Republic of South Africa).  
 
 
Table 5.8: Imports from China 
The Effect of Tax Rate on Evasion (Measured in Physical Quantity) 
 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
Std. Err 
 
t  
 
tp >  
 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
 
 
Tax Rate 
 
0.104 
 
0.002 
 
35.26*** 
 
0.000 
 
0.098 
 
0.110 
Constant  -3.042 0.131 -23.07*** 0.000 -3.302 -2.782 
 
       
 Obs    =  271  Prob>F =       0.000 
 F(1, 1645)   = 1243.2  Adj R-squared =       0.821 
 
      
Note: (i) ***Indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level  
(ii) Dependent Variable: log (Quantity of Exports from China to United 
Republic of Tanzania)-log (Quantity of Imports to Tanzania from China).  
 
When using GQ as the dependent variable, interestingly, when Avg(Tax_o) is 
included into the regression, the coefficient on tax rate is significantly different 
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from zero and the coefficient on Avg(Tax_o) is negative and significant at 10 
percent for imports from South Africa (Table 5.9).  
 
Table 5.9: Incorporating the Average Tax on Similar Products 
 (Measured in Quantity): Import from Republic of South Africa 
 
 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
Std. Err 
 
t  
 
tp >
 
 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
 
 
Tax Rate 
 
0.536 
 
0.054 
 
9.92*** 
 
0.000 
 
0.426 
 
0.645 
Avg(tax_o) -0.752 0.039 -1.90* 0.066 -0.155 0.005 
Constant  -10.746 1.823 -1.89*** 0.000 -14.440 -7.051 
 
       
 Obs        = 40  Prob>F =       0.000 
 F(2, 37)  =   50.5  Adj R-squared =       0.717 
 
 
Note: (i) ***Indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level  
(ii) Dependent Variable: log (Quantity of Exports from Republic of South 
Africa to United Republic of Tanzania)-log (Quantity of Imports to Tanzania 
from Republic of South Africa).  
 
Table 5.10: Incorporating the Average Tax on Similar Products 
 (Measured in Quantity): Import from China 
 
 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
Std. Err 
 
t  
 
tp >  
 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
 
 
Tax Rate 
 
0.111 
 
0.005 
 
21.63*** 
 
0.000 
 
0.100 
 
0.121 
Avg(tax_o) 0.012 0.017      0.73 0.469 -0.022 0.048 
Constant  -4.062 0.801 -5.07*** 0.000 -5.650 -2.475 
 
       
 Obs      =         123  Prob>F =       0.000 
 F(2, 120)  =   237.4     Adj R-squared =       0.794 
 
 
Note: (i) ***Indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level  
(ii) Dependent Variable: log (Quantity of Exports from China to United 
Republic of Tanzania)-log (Quantity of Imports to Tanzania from China).  
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When using physical quantities of import data from China, regression results 
reported in Table 5.10 suggest that mislabeling a higher-taxed product as a 
lower-taxed product is not present. Generally, empirical results on tax rate and 
tax evasion show that first; there is evidence of underreporting in values and 
in quantities in the trade flow between Republic of South Africa and United 
Republic of Tanzania, on one hand and China and United Republic of Tanzania 
on the other. The evasion gap is positively correlated with tax rate, implying 
that any increase in tax rate is likely to produce a reduction rather than an 
increase in tax revenue. This result confirms the study by Osoro (1993) who 
reveals that, the major causes of tax evasion in Tanzania have been high tax 
rates that led to high tax bills or tax burdens.  Second, tax evasion takes a form 
of misclassification in imports from Republic of South Africa but it does not 
take the form of mislabeling from a higher taxed product to a lower taxed 
variety in imports from China. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper empirically examined tax rates as the determinants of tariff 
revenue evasion across products, based on a systematic analysis of 
discrepancies in trade declarations for trading partners. The paper adopted an 
approach by Fisman and Wei (2004) in measuring the effect of tax rates on tax 
evasion by looking at the reporting gap in Tanzania’s imports from South 
Africa and China as a function of Tanzanian tax rates (tariff plus VAT rates). 
The paper focused on two issues. The first is whether there is any correlation 
between tax evasion, as reported by the trade gap and the tax rate in Tanzania. 
This was done in two ways, whereas in the first, the study utilized data on 
exports and imports reported in values and in the second, the study utilized 
data on imports and exports reported quantities. The second issue is that 
whether the trade gap is due to mislabeling a higher-taxed products as a 
lower-taxed product, utilizing both value and quantity data. 
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The results indicated that evasion “gap” is highly correlated with tax rates, i.e. 
much more value is lost for products with higher tax rates. To avoid the heavy 
tax burden some potential and actual taxpayers have decided to go 
underground. The results also showed that the evasion gap is correlated with 
tax rates on closely rated products from Republic of South Africa, implying 
that evasion takes place through misclassification of imports from higher-
taxed categories to lower-taxed ones. However, there was no evidence of 
misclassification of imports from China. 
 
Tax evasion is the basic characteristic of many developing countries. De facto 
tax collections are consequently far below revenue implied by published or de 
jure tax rates. Efforts to address this problem have therefore been a key 
component of economic reform programmes geared at macroeconomic 
stabilization and promoting a better balance in public finances.  The wide 
divergences between the effective and statutory tax rates in Tanzanian tax 
system indicate that there is a scope for raising tax revenue without increasing 
tax rates by reinforcing tax and customs administrations and reducing tax 
evasion. Since high tariff rates make import under-valuation more lucrative, 
reduction in duty rates is a possible solution. However, Tanzania, which 
depends greatly on import taxes, may find it difficult to reduce duties beyond a 
point in the short-run, though reduction in duty can be partly compensated by 
way of greater yield from the resultant larger volume of imports at lower 
rates.  
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